Social Impact Bonds: The Role of Private Capital in Outcome-Based Commissioning by Edmiston, D & Nicholls, A
Jnl Soc. Pol.: page 1 of 20 ©Cambridge University Press 2017. This is anOpen Access article, distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits
unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
doi:10.1017/S0047279417000125
Social Impact Bonds: The Role of Private
Capital in Outcome-Based Commissioning
DANIEL EDMISTON∗ AND ALEX NICHOLLS∗∗
∗University of Oxford, Park End Street, Oxford, OX1 1HP, United Kingdom
email: Daniel.Edmiston@sbs.ox.ac.uk
∗∗University of Oxford, Park End Street, Oxford, OX1 1HP, United Kingdom
email: Alex.Nicholls@sbs.ox.ac.uk
Abstract
Social impact bonds are payment by results contracts that leverage private social
investment to cover the up-front expenditure associatedwithwelfare services. The introduction
of private principles and actors through outcome-based commissioning has received a great
deal of attention in social policy research. However, there has been much less attention given
to the introduction of private capital and its relation to more established forms of quasi-
marketisation. This paper examines what effect private social investment has on outcome-
based commissioning and whether the alternative forms of performance measurement and
management, that social impact bonds bring to bear on service operations, demonstrate the
capacity to engender: innovation in service delivery; improved social outcomes; future cost
savings; and additionality. This paper draws on an in-depth study of four social impact bonds
in the UK context, as the welfare regime at the vanguard of this policy development. The
findings suggest that the introduction of private capital in outcome-based commissioning
has had a number of unique and unintended effects on service providers, operations and
outcomes. The paper concludes by considering whether social impact bonds represent a risk or
an opportunity for public service reform both in the UK and further afield.
Introduction
Across advanced capitalist economies, the increased prominence of outcome-
based commissioning is underpinned by a desire to improve service quality,
mitigate risks associated with service experimentation and enhance the social
outcomes achieved using public resources (OECD, 2015).Within the UK context,
payment by results (PbR) has been drawn upon as a reformmechanism intended
to ‘stimulatemore openness and innovation in public services through new types
of providers within the public sector, where this will improve services and give
better value to the taxpayer’ (Cabinet Office, 2011: 40). In many respects, social
impact bonds (SIBs)1 can be understood as the latest manifestation of this policy
priority and part of a broader trend towards welfare pluralism in the UK.
SIBs are ‘a form of payment by results but extend this by harnessing
social investment from capital markets’ to cover the up-front costs of service
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intervention (McHugh et al., 2013: 247; Sinclair et al., 2014; Nicholls and
Tomkinson, 2015). At present, there are a relatively small number of SIBs
worldwide. However, as an emerging policy field, the number of contracts
is growing and at a remarkably fast rate (Fraser et al., 2016). This paper
focusesonSIBswithin theUKcontext, as thewelfare regimeat the vanguardof this
policy development, and lessons this might garner for their future development
internationally.
In a review of the existing literature, Fraser et al. (2016: 9) observe that
academic consideration of SIBs tends to be cautionary in terms of questioning
the ‘appropriateness of “private sector” values and mechanisms in the field of
public services’. Without doubt, the introduction of SIBs represents a concerted
commitment to reduce the role of the state in welfare provision. However,
characterizing these developments as a linear transition towards the privatisation
of ‘public’ services neglects the varied motivations and conditions that shape the
extent and character of welfare pluralism. In reality, a plurality of private actors,
logics and features interact within and across service dimensions to affect the
operation, impact and status of public services.
Beyond a critique of its contribution towards the quasi-marketisation of
public services, the increased role of private capital in the financing of welfare
provision is relatively under-explored and largely presumed in social policy
debates (Propper and Green, 2001). As a result, examination of the private
financing of welfare services has tended to overlook the heterogeneous kinds
of private capital present within public services and their dynamic influence on
service operations and delivery. Whilst the introduction of private principles
and actors through outcome-based commissioning has received a great deal of
attention in social policy research (Considine et al., 2011; Rees, 2013; Carter and
Whitworth, 2015), there has been much less attention given to the role of private
capital in the financing of welfare provision and its relation to more established
forms of quasi-marketisation.
To address this and the relative paucity of empirical evidence on SIBs
(Ronicle et al., 2014), this paper critically examines the role of private capital and,
more specifically, private social investment in outcome-based commissioning
and its effect on welfare services delivered through the SIB model. Above and
beyond the putative benefits of conventional outcome-based commissioning,
the introduction of private social investment has been justified according to a
number of linked policy objectives: innovation in service delivery (DWP, 2016:
14); improved social outcomes (Cabinet Office, 2014: 9; Bridges Ventures, 2016:
1); future cost savings (Cabinet Office, 2016b: 1; Social Finance, 2016: 23); and
additionality (Cabinet Office, 2011: 52; Cabinet Office, 2016a: 16). This paper
seeks to establish what bearing private capital has on welfare services delivered
throughPbRcontractingandwhetherSIBsdemonstrate the capacity to fulfil these
policy objectives. At present, there is a tendency within policy and practitioner
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discourse to suggest that the putative benefits accrued through the SIB funding
model are somewhat idiosyncratic and distinct from the PbR mechanism that
underpins it (e.g. Cabinet Office, 2010; Bridges Ventures, 2016; Cabinet Office,
2016c; Social Finance, 2016).With this inmind, there is a need to disambiguate the
respective and collective significance of private social investment and outcome-
based commissioning and their effect on welfare services.
The paper starts by situating SIBs and the introduction of private capital
within a broader policy context of outcome-based commissioning and welfare
pluralism. The remainder of the paper examines what effect private social invest-
ment has on outcome-based commissioning and whether the alternative forms
of performancemeasurement andmanagement that SIBs bring to bear on service
operations demonstrate the capacity to achieve their intended policy objectives.
Social impact bonds and outcome-based commissioning
There are two key features to outcome-based commissioning in public service
reform.Thefirst is a shift in focus away from service inputs, outputs andprocesses
and towards quantifiable social outcomes that dictate the rate and amount of
payment received by contracted service providers. Provided the appropriate
incentive structures are put in place, this has the capacity to drive up standards of
service provision and target resources where they aremost needed and impactful.
The second feature is that of risk transfer. By virtue of the PbR model, public
sector commissioners only pay for those specified outcomes that are achieved
through service interventions. In theory, this increases the accountability and
value formoney achieved throughpublic services. In this respect, policy discourse
presents PbR as a key means by which to increase the efficiency, effectiveness and
equitability of public services (Fox and Albertson, 2011: 356–360).
These prospective benefits of outcome-based commissioning have proven
appealing across policy domains and domestic contexts (Considine et al., 2011).
In the UK, PbR contracting has grown significantly and is estimated to be worth
at least £15 billion (NAO, 2015). In spite of this, the evidence base on the efficacy of
outcome-based commissioning is far from established. In certain instances, the
marketisation of social outcomes has been found to compromise service quality
and integrity due to ‘gaming’ and perverse incentives (Considine et al., 2011; Finn,
2011a; Rees et al., 2014). Other problems encountered include: high transaction
costs and reduced flexibility; a tendency towards efficiency savings rather than
improved service quality; and an excessive focus onways ofmeasuring outcomes,
rather than ways of working (Boyle, 2011; Finn, 2011b; NAO, 2015).
In many respects, SIBs fall within the broad gamut of outcome-based
commissioning (Fox and Albertson, 2011: 356). However, they possess a number
of features which distinguish them from conventional PbR schemes (Please
see Figure 1). The most central feature is that SIBs seek to leverage private
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279417000125
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Leeds, on 03 May 2017 at 12:54:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
4 daniel edmiston and alex nicholls
Figure 1. The Typical Structure of a Social Impact Bond.
social investment to cover the up-front expenditure associated with service
interventions (McHugh et al., 2013). In doing so, social investors are supposed
to take on some, or all, of the performance risk associated with experimental
service interventions. In theory, such an approach intends to redistribute the
financial risk of non-delivery not only away from public sector commissioners,
but also from service providers. For smaller and third sector organisations the
ostensible redistribution of risk through private social investment is supposed to
grant them ‘a place at the table’ in outcome-based commissioning where they
have previously struggled to compete and participate (OECD, 2015). However, in
reality, the degree of risk re-allocation differs significantly between SIB models
and to varying effects for involved parties. For example, service providers have
been known to co-invest in SIBs and variable guarantees to social investors
have, in certain instances, undermined the redistribution of financial risk in SIB
contracts. In addition, the majority of SIB contracts have been awarded to larger
third sector organisations, which suggests a lack of sufficient risk redistribution
to allow smaller third sector organisations to participate. For the public sector,
the substantial amount of seed funding that goes into the scoping and feasibility
of various SIB contracts, suggests that service experimentation through SIBs is
not without its financial or reputational risks for public sector commissioners.
Capitalising on the expertise and skills of these organisations, service
interventions funded through SIBs focus on achieving one or more social
outcomes. SIBs tend to be targeted at populations with highly complex needs,
most vulnerable to social exclusion and policy failure, that would benefit from
tailored, responsive and intensive service interventions (Cabinet Office, 2016b).
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Thismay involve exploratory trials in service provisionwhere an intervention has
not previously been available or has historically failed to produce desired social
outcomes. Due to the preventative nature of service interventions, the anticipated
cost-savings prospectively accruedby thepublic sector are used to fund the service
as well as justify the returns paid to private social investors. As demonstrated
later in this paper, these projected cost-savings are, at present, often hypothetical
and poorly, if at all, evidenced through social impact measurement. Crucially,
this brings into question the extent to which SIBs redistribute the financial risk of
‘failed’ service interventions away from the public sector and onto private social
investors.
In policy discourse, social investors are predominantly understood as those
that are ‘socially-minded’ in their investment portfolio, that is, seeking a blended
social and economic return on their investment (CabinetOffice, 2016c).However,
in reality, social investors vary greatly in terms of the profile of their capital
contribution to SIB contracts. A broad spectrumof individual and organisational
SIB investors may: prioritise a financial return on their investment over social
outcomes achieved; forego a (higher rate of) return for the sake of social impacts
pursued through service interventions; or seek a compromise between the two.
As a result, the syndicate of social investors within any given SIB are likely to
have different (and potentially conflicting) ‘motivations, which can lend itself
to a layered capital structure’ (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015: 24). As such, SIB
capital finance might involve private social investment as it is predominantly
conceived (along with the heterogeneity of motivations underpinning it), but
may also include private philanthropy through (non-) recoverable grants, loans
and investment guarantees. With this in mind, the terms ‘social investor’ and
‘social investment’ are used in this paper to refer to a plurality of private actors
and capitals, as well as degrees and terms of investment that shape the character
and effect of private finance in PbR contracts delivered through the SIB model.
Equally, the term ‘private capital’, as a superordinate category, is used in this
paper to refer to the range of non-public finance items that interact alongside
one another, with varying effects on outcome-based commissioning.
In the UK, social investment within PbR has been presented as ‘another
way in which greater competition has been introduced to public service reform
to drive up quality and improve outcomes’ (Cabinet Office, 2014: 9). This is
primarily based on an understanding that the introduction of private capital
offers a number of supererogatory benefits to conventional forms of outcome-
based commissioning. In theory, the up-front capital provided through an SIB
opens up economic space for civil society organisations to explore, test and scale
service innovations (Cabinet Office, 2016b). Whilst service providers are granted
a degree of autonomy and flexibility from public sector commissioners, the social
finance intermediary introduces newmethods of performancemeasurement and
management into the PbR contract to bring ‘an additional layer of rigor and
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scrutiny to’ social welfare programmes (Social Finance, 2016: 16). This additional
level of oversight and accountability introduced through ‘performance-based
financing and public-private partnership’ is believed to mitigate against some
of the aforementioned problems associated with conventional outcome-based
commissioning (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015: 2).
On this basis, political and policy interest in SIBs has gathered pace
internationally, but particularly within the UK context. The world’s first SIB was
developed under New Labour to tackle recidivism and launched in Peterborough
under the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government in late 2010.
Since then, central government has sought to provide civil society organisations
‘with the start-up funding and support they need to bid for government
contracts or work towards delivering services under a payment by results model’
(Conservative Party, 2010: 38). Thus far, a variety of public funding initiatives
have provided grants, support and subsidies to support the scoping, design
and operation of SIBs so that these may be taken up more widely by central
and local government. This includes the Social Outcomes Fund (£20 million),
Commissioning Better Outcomes Fund (£40 million), DWP Innovation Fund
(£30 million), Youth Engagement Fund (£16 million) and Fair Chances Fund
(£15million). In 2012, the Cabinet Office established the Centre for Social Impact
Bonds. In 2016, theCabinetOffice commissioned theGovernmentOutcomes Lab
and launched the Life Chances Fund to grow ‘the number and scale of SIBs’ with
a view to ‘generating public sector efficiencies by delivering better outcomes . . .
and building a clear evidence base of what works’ (Cabinet Office, 2016b: 1).
Despite the fanfare surrounding them, the evidence base onhowandwhether
SIBs work is notably limited (Ronicle et al., 2014). With that in mind, the
remainder of this paper seeks to establish what effect private social investment
has on outcome-based commissioning and whether SIBs exhibit the capacity to
engender: innovation in service delivery; improved social outcomes; future cost
savings; and additionality.
Methods
This paper presents findings from a study exploring the origins and operation of
SIBs in the UK context. An initial survey of the SIB landscape was undertaken to
establish the varying models and remit of those contracts that are or have been
operational. Based on this, four SIBs were selected for detailed consideration: the
EssexMulti-Systemic Therapy (MST) SIB, theMerseysideNewHorizons SIB and
the LondonHomelessness SIBs. Thesewere selected as a heterogeneous purposive
sample that exhibited considerable variation in termsof the: role of organisational
and individual social investors; contract lengths and sizes; beneficiaries targeted;
individual and multiple outcome payment metrics; position and presence of
social finance intermediaries and special purpose vehicles; varying rates of return
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279417000125
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Leeds, on 03 May 2017 at 12:54:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
private capital in social impact bonds 7
for social investors; and nature and extent of seed and grant funding drawn
upon. Beyond this, as part of the first cohort of UK SIBs, these are some of
the few contracts that have been in operation for a sufficient amount of time
for it to be possible to establish their operation and effects. Each of the SIBs is
briefly summarised below, but further details on their key features are available
in Online Appendix 1 (Supplementary Materials).
Commissioned by Essex County Council, the EssexMST SIBwas established
to reduce the number of days children spent in residential care. Action for
Childrenwas commissioned to delivermulti-systemic therapy to support families
and children on the edge of residential care. The Merseyside New Horizons
SIB was commissioned directly by the Department for Work and Pensions as
part of the Innovation Fund: an open competition designed to tackle youth
unemployment through the establishment of 10 SIBs. A syndicate of social
investors supported Career Connect to deliver a service helping disadvantaged
young people to ‘participate and succeed in education or training and thereby
improve their employability, reducing their longer term dependency on benefits’
(DWP, 2015: 5). Through funding supplied by the Department for Communities
and Local Government, the Greater London Authority commissioned two
LondonHomelessness SIBs. Delivered through services by St.Mungo’s Broadway
and Thames Reach respectively, these SIBs were designed to improve the
employment, education, training, housing and health outcomes of a cohort of
entrenched rough sleepers.
As illustrated elsewhere, the particular contractual, governance and funding
arrangements of these SIBs greatly affect their respective design, operation and
outcomes (Edmiston and Aro, 2016). Whilst variation between the different
SIBs under consideration is acknowledged and accounted for in the analysis
undertaken, this paper principally focuses on exploring the broader role of
private capital in outcome-based commissioning across a heterogeneous set
of SIB cases. Examination of the four SIBs comprised analysis of stakeholder
documentation, process and impact evaluations as well as qualitative fieldwork
with cross-sectoral stakeholders. Between 2015 and 2016, 41 qualitative interviews
were undertaken with policymakers, public sector commissioners from local and
central government, third sector service providers, social finance intermediaries
and entities, social investors and service users. The principle majority of these
participants were directly involved in (or affected by) the financing, governance
and service interventions delivered through the four SIBs considered. A smaller
number of national-level stakeholders were also interviewed who were more
tangentially involved but have nonetheless been instrumental in the development
and uptake of SIBs at the national level. Beyond this, we also organised a
practitioner seminar and a policy roundtable to facilitate an applied discussion
between policy-relevant stakeholders and also undertook a range of informal
interviews and correspondence.
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To varying degrees, all those interviewed for this study had a vested interest
in the success of their respective SIB, or SIBsmore generally. In order tomoderate
some of the inferences drawn from the data, all analysis undertaken has reflected
upon how this might affect the responses of stakeholders. All service users
interviewed for this studywere approached through gatekeepers andwere offered
a £15 shopping voucher as a thank you for their time. All other participants
were sent an email, inviting them to participate in the research along with
an information sheet and consent form. Sound ethical practice and standards
underpinned the research process to safeguard the anonymity, confidentiality
and welfare of all research participants.
The role of ‘private’ capital in outcome-based commissioning
This section establishes what bearing the introduction of private capital within
these PbR contracts has on the fulfilment of four key policy objectives
underpinning the development of UK SIBs.
Innovation in service delivery?
Proponents of SIBs suggest that the introduction of private social investment
in PbR contracting has the capacity to create space for service experimentation
and innovation because it redistributes part, or all, of the financial risk of non-
delivery ‘away from government and small providers and onto social investors’
(Disley et al., 2011: 16; Cooper et al., 2013; Cabinet Office, 2016c). In theory, this
makes it possible for smaller and civil society organisations to participate in
outcome-based commissioning in a way that they have, thus far, struggled to do
(OECD, 2015).
A substantial number of those interviewed felt that social investment had
the capacity to foster experimental and innovative service interventions. Civil
servants, social investors and social impact entities were particularly keen to
suggest that the ‘small-scale and experimental’ nature of projects supported
through SIBs was only possible because social investors were taking on the social
risk in return for a prospective financial return:
. . . the voluntary and community sector are often best placed to deliver the innovative and very
localised services . . . and traditionally have suffered in perhaps not being able to take on the
risk of payment by results. So this was a way of actually building their capability and capacity
to ensuring that their up front costs were covered . . . (senior civil servant, 13)
SIBs are repeatedly cited as a means by which to ‘promote innovation in
social services and bring market forces to bear on service providers previously
funded by traditional government grants’ (Cooper et al., 2013: 2). Some public
sector and social finance stakeholders (including social investors and social
impact investment entities) felt that the presence of private investment and
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actors capitalised on the capacity and freedom of third sector organisations to
foster innovation in service delivery whilst:
also bringing in a model which we think is constructed around a more rigorous approach
towards assessing and evaluating specific sets of interventions and where appropriate looking
to scale those up (senior civil servant, 12)
Compared to the impact measurement usually required, third sector
organisations felt that there was a greater degree of oversight and accountability
expected by private social investors in SIBs. In theory, the additional systems of
performance measurement and management instigated through an SIB induce a
change in how third sector organisations realise their social mission by focusing
on social outcomes (DWP, 2014). However, across the four SIBs considered
here, social investors had a number of supererogatory expectations that service
providers collect information on inputs, outputs and processes extending well
beyond pre-defined payment metrics. This was motivated by a desire to establish
what particular features and conditions of a service intervention worked and to
cultivate a dynamic environment for service innovation.
In certain contexts, this created a substantial additional administrative
burden for service providers. As a result, some third sector stakeholders felt
that the degree of micro-management built into the SIB was actually reducing
their flexibility to autonomously pursue their social mission. Some felt that
the resources and time that went into these additional forms of performance
management and measurement could be better spent on front-line services.
We underestimated the amount of management time that was required to run an SIB and we
radically under-estimated the kind of information demand there would be from investors . . .
progress reports and forecasts and re-forecasts . . . (third sector stakeholder, 16)
If anything I would say less, there was less flexibility. Because the amount of management
structures that are placed on an SIB mean that you have less manoeuvrability, you have to clear
everything with this board to get permission to do anything. (third sector stakeholder, 25)
At times, service providers felt pressured to secure outcomes to such an extent
that they took measures to ‘insulate’ their front-line staff from the influence of
certain social investors. The ‘marketisation’ exerted by the influence of social
investors had the capacity to encourage outcome-focused service provision.
However, in certain instances, it equally ran the risk of promoting dysfunctional
practices such as ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ (Rees et al., 2014; Carter andWhitworth,
2015). This was particularly the case when individual social investors had a
prominent role in assessing and managing the operational performance of an
SIB through their involvement with a special purpose vehicle. Some third sector
organisations buffered against these pressures:
I think you’ve got to be careful you don’t contaminate your professional practice... I have to
fend off the investors and have the financially focused discussion . . . otherwise you start to get
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279417000125
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Leeds, on 03 May 2017 at 12:54:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
10 daniel edmiston and alex nicholls
into some quite questionable practices and run the risk of people starting to do things because
of financial pressures . . . (third sector stakeholder, 39)
In many ways, the up-front capital from social investors protected service
providers from the financial and operational risks associated with innovation
in service delivery. However, the extent of risk re-allocation varied significantly
across the SIBs considered. For example,ThamesReach andStMungo’sBroadway
both ‘co-invested’ their own equity into their respective SIBs, which, despite the
presence of other social investors, may have inhibited their capacity (or perhaps
willingness) to engage in more experimental service provision. As discussed later
in this paper, this might go someway towards explaining why these two SIBs have
observed suchmixed performances in terms of the attainment of social outcomes.
Despite this, the SIB fundingmodel does, overall, appear to have helped overcome
some of the limitations of previous PbR schemes that have exhibited an aversion
to service experimentation, flexibility and innovation due to the risks associated
with prospective financial losses (Finn, 2011b). This seems to indicate that the
presence of social investment has the capacity to mitigate against some of the
limitations that have, thus far, proven endemic to contracted-out services on a
PbR basis. This includes reduced flexibility for service providers (Finn, 2011b)
and a tendency towards innovations that centre on efficiency savings rather than
improved service quality or effectiveness (Hudson et al., 2010).
However, the additional oversight that private social investment brought
to bear on service operations had a number of unintended effects. Whilst
intensive, real-time performance measurement and management introduced a
heightened degree of ‘responsiveness’, ‘discipline’ and ‘rigour’ to contracts, it also
detracted resources from front-line service provision and reduced the autonomy
of some front-line practitioners. The requirement to measure social outcomes,
but also record and seek approval for service processes in real-time, demanded
a change in the way third sector organisations planned, revised and executed
their operational strategy. In many respects, this leveraged specialist expertise
and skills in a way that was most efficacious to target beneficiaries. However, at
times, it appears to have equally detracted from the flexibility and discretion of
service providers in terms of resource allocation and front-line service provision.
As found in previous studies of PbR contracts, there was an excessive focus on
ways of measuring outcomes, rather than ways of working and incentivising
innovation (Boyle, 2011; NAO, 2015). At times, the presence of private capital
exacerbated, rather than helped to overcome, this limitation of outcome-based
commissioning.
Based on the SIBs considered here, private social investment does appear to
bring an additional layer of ‘private sector rigor andperformancemanagement’ to
service operations (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015: 2). However, it is not clear that
this facilitates any measure of service innovation that would not otherwise have
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been present through other fundingmodels. If anything private social investment
ran the risk of corrupting the integrity of outcome-based commissioning that
targeted those most vulnerable to social exclusion by restricting the autonomy of
third sector organisations.
Improved social outcomes?
The economic underpinnings of SIBs require social outcomes achieved to
be better or greater than those secured through existing service interventions
(Bridges Ventures, 2016: 8; Social Finance, 2016). In spite of the current
interest in the potential of SIBs there is, at present, very little systematic
evidence on the attainment of improved social outcomes (Ronicle et al., 2014;
Ronicle et al., 2016).
Regarding the four SIBs under consideration, it is clear that these had
wide-ranging positive effects on many target beneficiaries. Beyond the existing
evaluations discussed below, qualitative fieldwork found that service users valued
the tailored and intensive support received and felt that this helped them come
closer to achieving their personal goals:
If it weren’t for [practitioner name], I wouldn’t be here. And that’s actually the truth . . .
Everyone I knew thought that I probably wouldn’t make it until the end of the (school) year
and I surprised myself how long I’ve lasted. (service user, 22)
I’d say it’s helped quite a bit in terms of helping me get to where I want to be. I’m not there yet
but I will be. If they didn’t help me I suppose I’d still be homeless. (service user, 30)
Very often the achievement of social outcomes was attributed to the holistic
service interventions funded as part of the SIB. A number of service users felt
that the personalised and regular nature of support helped them overcome the
challenges they faced:
Hedid all the paperwork for that – if he hadn’t of done that I’d probably still be in the hostel now.
They were constantly on the phonewithme and I needed that – just that little bit of guidance . . .
you know more hands on – just to get me in the door sort of thing. (service user, 41)
Outcome-focused provision underpinned by service learning and flexibility
appeared to produce a number of positive outcomes for target populations (DWP,
2014; OPM, 2015; St Mungo’s Broadway, 2015; Thames Reach, 2015). However,
whether this represents an improvement relative to previous or existing services
and whether outcomes achieved can be attributed to the presence of the private
social investment remains less clear.
The London Homelessness SIBs positively affected the outcomes and
opportunities of many service users through innovative and intensive service
provision (St Mungo’s Broadway, 2015; Thames Reach, 2015). Nonetheless, the
available evidence suggests that service interventions, delivered through the
Thames Reach and StMungo’s Broadway SIBs, under-performed in certain areas
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and struggled to fulfil a number of the pre-defined outcome targets (DCLG,
2015). This included reducing the rate of rough sleeping below a modelled
baseline, meeting initial and sustained repatriation targets and helping service
users secure qualifications, volunteering and part-time work opportunities. In
particular, the absence of a special purpose vehicle in the Thames Reach SIB
appears to have negatively affected the degree of performance management in
service operations, with it faring worse than St Mungo’s Broadway in terms of
securing and sustaining social outcomes. In certain areas, the performance of
both SIBs exceeded targets for securing stable accommodation for entrenched
rough sleepers and the sustainment of full-time employment. However, on the
only modelled baseline, the SIBs fell short of target reductions in rough sleeping
(Ronicle et al., 2014: 40–41). In light of this, there is no current evidence to
suggest that these SIBs were able to produce improved social outcomes relative
to previous and other existing service interventions.
By contrast, available evidence suggests that the Merseyside New Horizons
SIB significantly exceeded its initial targets on improved attendance and
behaviour in school, as well as attainment of NVQ Level 1 (Social Finance,
2016: 29). In addition, the final qualitative evaluation of the DWP Innovation
Fund, found that virtually all young people interviewed were positive about the
support services they received (DWP, 2016: 48). There is also some evidence
to suggest that the financing model proved instrumental in the attainment of
outcomes achieved. Many stakeholders involved in the DWP Innovation Fund
felt that the presence of social investors and their interest in social outcomes being
achieved led to a very hands-on approach in ensuring services were performing
to profile and were able to achieve ‘better results than they would have done
had the pilot been commissioned using more traditional procurement methods’
(DWP, 2016: 32).
The latest evaluation of the Essex MST SIB suggests that outcomes achieved
are exceeding pre-defined targets and national averages (OPM, 2015). The Essex
MST is also proving slightly more effective than other MST services nationally.
In spite of this, due to the context within which the SIB has been established, it
is difficult to ascribe improvement to the presence of private social investment
and its bearing on service outcomes. Firstly, the multi-systemic therapy provided
through the SIB is a novel service offer for Essex County Council. Secondly,
a substantial restructuring of the Council’s children’s support services occurred
alongside the introductionof theSIB.As a result, the comparisonof theSIB’s effect
on social outcomes against a historical baseline proves highly problematic. This
makes it particularly challenging to establish how the SIB structure impacts on the
implementation of MST and whether social investment in the PbR mechanism
adds any further value in terms of outcomes or performance.Whilst the required
adherence to and rigidity of the MST model of intervention leaves less space
to innovate and take risks, there are some signs to suggest that social investors
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are introducing more rigorous governance mechanisms into the PbR model.
This includes drawing on a flexible funding pot where it is believed this will
lead to improved outcomes and pursuing alternative strategies for personnel
management. In this respect, the Essex SIB model exhibits the capacity to ensure
the service provider adheres to targets for pre-defined social outcomes and
payment metrics (OPM, 2015).
Basedon the evidence available, service interventionsoffered through the SIB
model demonstrate the capability to produce a range of valuable social outcomes
for service beneficiaries. However, there is limited and, at times, partial evidence
that the presence of private social investment in outcome-based commissioning
is securing improved social outcomes. In certain instances this is simply because
a service intervention has failed to deliver on pre-defined outcome metrics when
compared against a baseline. On other occasions, however, there is a broader
problem of standards of evidence and the inevitable challenges associated with
defining and measuring the ‘impact’ and ‘value-added’ of SIBs relative to other
forms of outcome-based commissioning. At present, the vast majority of SIBs
worldwide employ performance and payment metrics that rely on the validation
of administrative data, as opposed to more complex evaluation methods that
involve a comparison of service beneficiaries to other, more comparable groups
through counterfactuals (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015: 20).
In conclusion, there are some SIBs employing effective and rigorous
systems of impact measurement. Overall, however, the validity and viability
of comparative baselines tends to be quite poor, with SIBs lacking a genuine
historical or real-time baseline through which to measure the relative social,
economic and operational value of a service intervention. This leads to difficulties
associated with evidencing effects, relying on proxy indicators of social outcomes
and the spurious attribution of causes and effects within the SIBmodel (McHugh
et al., 2013). Taken together, these factors represent a serious challenge for
establishing the relative effects of an innovative service intervention alongside
an experimental financing model.
Having said that, social investors and social finance intermediaries do appear
to have introduced heightened degrees of scrutiny and rigour into the governance
of the PbR contracts examined here. Through real-time assessment of social
outcomes and operations, service providers were both compelled and supported
to ‘stay on track’ in triggering outcome payments. Whether this can, or will, lead
to a relative improvement in social outcomes remains to be confirmed.
Future cost savings?
Many intensive PbR interventions are justified on the basis that subsequent
public sector savings will be observable if social outcomes are achieved. Similarly,
many of the SIB outcomes and payment metrics are constructed based on the
prospective financial savings that they may eventually create for the public sector
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(Social Finance, 2016: 23). With this in mind, commissioners need payment
metrics within the SIB model ‘to reflect the balance in savings that are generated
for the wider public sector’ (Cabinet Office, 2016b: 1). Based on the premise
of preventative service provision, this funding model is presented as having the
‘potential to help deliver public servicesmore efficiently and, in some cases, tackle
the underlying causes of growing demand for services instead of just trying to
cope with their consequences’ (Cabinet Office, 2016a: 7).
Without evidenced effects confirming the relative improvement of social
outcomes, the prospective savings achieved through an SIB are unlikely to be
observed in the public sector. This is particularly problematic if private social
investors are paid on the assumptions that cost savings will be made and the
high transaction costs associated with SIB set-up and service experimentation
will be covered as a result. A number of cross-sectoral stakeholders interviewed
for this study felt that the high transaction costs associated with developing the
SIB threatened the future cost savings achievable:
If it wasn’t for certain logistical difficulties, you would probably want to do it directly because
it adds to the costs – very high transactions costs (social investor, 11)
Whilst those involved in the establishment and operation of SIBs tended
to acknowledge the diverse needs and complex circumstances of service
beneficiaries, there was, nonetheless, a tendency to assume fixity to the social
outcomes achieved. Very often, the permanency of social outcomes secured (or
thought to be secured) was presumed and built into the economic modelling
of an SIB. The consequent payments to private social investors were justified
on the assumption that outcomes were both sustained and carried through to
changes in behaviour, outcomes and opportunities for target beneficiaries. In
reality, service users are subject to a dynamic set of conditions within and beyond
the SIB intervention.
Due to the significant challenges and needs faced by some service users, the
sustainability of particular outcomes was threatened or lost following the service
intervention. By virtue of the outcome-based contracts underpinning the SIB
model, services focus on achieving social outcomes, rather than the continuity
of service outputs characteristic of conventional public sector commissioning.
This, perhaps, goes some way towards explaining why a small number of service
beneficiaries wanted there to be ‘more of a transition period’ and felt somewhat
‘abandoned’ once outcomes had been achieved:
I’m surprised the way its just been ended so suddenly – it’s meant I’m not doing so well now.
(service user, 19)
I’m struggling at the moment . . . I’ve moved so far away from everybody. That hasn’t helped
and its something I’ve got to sort out. I’ve relapsed and I’m hoping it’s not permanent. (service
user, 30)
of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279417000125
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Leeds, on 03 May 2017 at 12:54:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
private capital in social impact bonds 15
This poses a number of difficult questions about the legacy of SIBs and
the extent to which social outcomes, however improved, can reasonably be
considered to have a permanent effect on service users. This is particularly
significant because, by and large, SIB payment metrics are constructed based
on the assumption that social outcomes achieved through service interventions
are lasting, and can therefore be justified in light of the prospective cost savings
they accrue to the public sector over time. Beyond this, the fragility with which
certain social outcomes are secured and maintained points to the importance
of service continuity and support infrastructure existing alongside SIBs offering
more intensive, if only temporary, assistance to target populations.
Additionality?
SIBs are widely presented as having the capacity to ‘unlock an unprecedented
flow of finance for social sector organisations . . . to tackle ingrained social
problemswhichweigh heavily on our society and national purse’ (Social Finance,
2009; Cabinet Office, 2011; Cabinet Office, 2016a). Whilst the social outcomes
achieved through SIBs are eventually capitalised through government payments,
the private capital invested tends to be seen as supplementary to and distinct from
the public funding landscape. In reality, the presence of the former is contingent
on the latter.
Nonetheless, a number of civil servants, social investors and social impact
entities interviewed for this study felt that social investment was an effective
means by which to secure additional resources that would otherwise remain
inaccessible to third sector organisations and ‘could improve the quality and
availability of public services’ (Cabinet Office, 2011: 41; Bridges Ventures, 2016).
This was particularly the case for those advocating the benefits of private social
investment over philanthropic donations:
I feel able to back some social investments with more investment money than I might be able
to do with gift money which I think is part of the logic of social investment in the first place:
unlocking genuinely new money (social investor and director of special purpose vehicle, 23)
The introduction of this ‘additional’ capital has occurred alongside
substantial cuts to government grants and a steady increase in government
contracts for the voluntary and community sector since 2010 (NCVO, 2016).
As a result, senior civil servants felt it particularly important for third sector
organisations to become ‘investment-ready’ in order to adapt to and survive the
changing funding landscape:
All of the actors working in the social field have to change a little bit of their mind set otherwise
they will simply die and no longer be able to offer a service because the public budgets are
scarcer and scarcer (senior civil servant, 13)
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More recently, there has been a slight upturn in funding received by ‘super-
major’ charities (NCVO, 2016). However, smaller organisations that are less well
equipped to bid for large-scale public sector contracts have struggled to recover
funding lost since 2010 (NCVO, 2016). Needless to say, this poses a significant
challenge for the capacity and operations of third sector organisations. Alongside
this, political and policy interest in social investment has grown considerably
and has been presented as a new funding model to fill a gap in existing service
provision (Disley et al., 2011; CabinetOffice, 2016a). In spite of this, themajority of
the third sector stakeholders interviewed for this study viewed social investment
as a tool of ‘last resort’:
In an ideal world we (charities and voluntary and community groups) wouldn’t have to resort
to social investment. (third sector stakeholder, 4)
Given that we live in a country where the welfare state has withdrawn from that level of
intervention, then social investment is an effective alternative. (third sector stakeholder, 16)
Within the context of increasing financial uncertainty for third sector service
providers, social investment has been pitched as ‘a source of additional funding
when public spending is constrained’ (Ronicle et al., 2014: 35). To the extent
that social investment has, in certain instances, enabled ‘the commissioning
of services that would otherwise not be commissioned’, SIBs can be seen as
fulfilling the objective of additionality in terms of both resources secured and
social outcomes achieved. Having said that, the validity of this interpretation
greatly depends on the stakeholder in question and whether SIBs are viewed
within their narrower or broader context. For public sector commissioners,
the risk re-allocation afforded through up-front private capital can be seen as
offering a financingmodel that facilitates additional service experimentation and
innovation. However, for smaller third sector organisations, confronted with
significant cuts to their statutory funding, private social investment represents
an alternative funding stream to deliver contracted-out welfare services. More
broadly, themarketisation introduced throughprivate social investment, runs the
risk of undermining ‘the distinctive contributions that nonprofit organisations
make to creating and maintaining a strong civil society’ through value-driven
services, advocacy, voluntarism, community-focused social networks and civic
participation (Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004: 138).
Conclusion
Proponents of SIBs suggest that private capital within outcome-based
commissioning has the capacity to leverage additional resources for innovative
services that will lead to improved social outcomes and future cost savings for
the public sector. In this regard, the introduction of private social investment
does present an opportunity to fund welfare services that would otherwise not
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be commissioned within the current climate of welfare withdrawal and fiscal
recalibration in advanced capitalist economies. However, there is, at present,
very little definitive evidence to suggest that services funded through such a
mechanism lead to any relative improvement in social outcomes compared to
more conventional PbR commissioning models. In great part, this is due to
the poor availability and standards of evidence that are currently available,
and the challenges associated with accurately identifying the attainment and
cause of complex social outcomes over time. However, where there is evidence
available, it is rather mixed. With this in mind, SIBs present a new set of risks
and opportunities in the field of public service reform.
In theory, the presence of private capital in outcome-based commissioning
has the capacity to accommodate for, and buffer against, the risks associated with
public service innovation, which may, in turn, engender an improvement in the
social outcomes achieved through public sector commissioning. The findings
of this paper suggest that private social investment helps overcome some of the
existing limitations of PbR contracting by, inter alia, re-distributing the financial
risks of non-delivery. However, for the SIBs considered here, the prospective
benefits of service innovation appeared to originate more from the novelty, size
and experimental nature of the PbR contract, rather than the presence of private
capital and the attendant functions it brought to bear on service operations. If
anything, the presence of private social investment appeared to stifle the flexibility
and autonomy of service providers to innovate and deliver services according to
their social mission within a PbR contract. In addition, far from granting smaller
third sector organisations a place at the table in outcome-based commissioning,
SIBs have principally been awarded to larger third sector organisations deemed
to be ‘investment-ready’.
Private social investment and the real-time performance measurement and
management fostered through the SIB model did increase the responsiveness of
service provision by encouraging and, at times, compelling service providers to
perform to profile. However, in certain instances, this ran the risk of corrupting
the integrity of the, albeit poorly designed, PbR contract by encouraging ‘gaming’
amongst thosewith a vested interest in the attainment of social outcomes.Overall,
SIBs appear to entail a rolling back of state-directed process regulation (through
outcome-based commissioning), but a rolling forward of process regulation
by newly introduced private actors (through social investment). In reality, the
motivations and characteristics of these private social investors and social finance
intermediaries arediverse andwide-ranging.As such, the influence they exert over
service operations in termsofmaximising efficiency, effectiveness and equitability
varies significantly according to the particular configuration of private actors and
interests served within any given SIB. Such variability, without oversight from
public sector commissioners, is likely to exacerbate the challenges encountered
through more conventional PbR contracting.
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Due to their infancy, it remains unclear whether and under what
circumstances SIBs might be considered appropriate or suitable within the
broader context of public service reform. As the evidence base surrounding
SIBs emerges, particular attention needs to be paid to improving the standards
and methods of social impact measurement and establishing the relative (dis-)
benefits of private social investment in outcome-based commissioning. This
paper goes some way towards contributing to this emerging evidence base, but
there are inevitable limitations in trying to explore the operation and effects
of SIBs through the perspectives of those who have a vested interest in their
development anduptake.Tomoderate someof the (idealised) claims surrounding
SIBs, further critical and independent consideration is needed to establish the
relative role and significance of private capital in outcome-based commissioning.
Without this and evidenced effects of improved (and sustained) social outcomes,
the public sector runs the risk of paying increased transaction costs associated
with private social investment without realising the putative benefits offered
through the SIB model.
Supplementary material
To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/
10.1017/S0047279417000125
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by the EU FP7 project ‘Creating Economic Space for Social
Innovation’ (grant agreement no 613261). Versions of this paper were presented at the UK
Social Policy Association Conference 2016 in Belfast; the International Social Innovation
Research Conference 2016 in Glasgow; the EUCLID Summit 2016 in Zagreb; and the ‘Widening
Perspectives on Social Impact Bond’ Conference 2016 in London. The authors are grateful for
the generous feedback and input received from delegates during these events and to the two
anonymous referees for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
Note
1 A range of cognate terms for SIBs are used internationally: ‘Pay for Success Schemes’ in the
US, ‘Social Bonds’ in New Zealand, and ‘Social Benefit Bonds’ in Australia.
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